June 1, 2016

'Never enough'

Apart from philosophical and linguistical usages exactly, I would argue the sentiment of the implication has also to do more with the speculative grammar of demotion, originally advanced specially by Petrus Helias in the early 12th century leading to work of the modistae in the second half of the 13th, as the implication itself is accorded in psychological term anger in general  terms and although, for the school of philosophy in western Europa in the high middle-ages,  was important in the history of linguistics for the development speculative grammar.  

Thus, the experience of one being gratuitously offended themselves by seeing or hearing something and the corresponding feeling of shame and guilt thereby for anger motivation can also be understood in subtle with an idealized subject complement *object, to say, 'that it isn’t about me'.  It isn’t funny yet that it happened lately to me having to write something to a taxman for the same obliterating of significant identity detail in ingratitude and scapegoating the sentiment of innuendo for defamation. (See a letter bellow or here.)

Apart from psychological or linguistical usages, we hear or sense this from people with the multitude of sentiments as happiness or unhappiness. Even after good first class honors degree in philosophy and reading some good books, we may perhaps still in curious as to where a phrase like ‘never enough’ would be puzzled in for its logical equivalent. (Putative proposition? Analytic proposition, Synthetic proposition? Statement? Or?

Whether or not  one chooses to include the phrase in the class of  empirical proposition and so to admit that such an empirical proposition can be conclusively verified, it will remain true that vast majority of propositions that people actually express are neither themselves basic observation statements  nor deducible form a finite thought. Consequently, if the principle of verification is to be seriously considered as criterion of meaning, it must be interpreted in such a way as to admit there must be something for sense-experience to be relevant to the determination of its truth and falsehood or render its probable in something else.   

But how then is it to be further understood in philosophy? Since all the statements are propositions, I would argue that it might still only be argued as if it is incomplete for a criterion of meaning without exposing it in an analytic validity. It is thus, contrary to common sense, only an analytic proposition with the premiss either ‘something to venture, something to win’ or ‘something to venture, something to loose’ as happiness and unhappiness respectably to unfold their ways of describing a means of determining  the use of  the principle of verification with them.

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